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As the editors of a volume that was such a collaborative and interactive effort, it is difficult to acknowledge the many people, organizations, and institutions who contributed to it. Nevertheless, it is fair to attribute the book's existence in large part to the active support of the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR), a virtual think tank comprised of forty-one colleagues, all of whom are working academics in the fields of law, economics, philosophy, and science. Eight of the authors contributing chapters to this book (Professors Adelman, Applegate, Cranor, Doremus, Hornstein, McGarity, Shapiro, and Squibb), as well as ourselves, are CPR member scholars.
We conceived of the principles that are at the heart of this book, and developed many of the ideas that are presented to explain them, at meetings organized and sponsored by CPR and the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP). We are especially grateful to CPR funders -the Beldon Fund and the Deer Creek Foundation -for providing the financial resources that made many of the key sessions possible. We also thank the University of Maryland and University of Texas Schools of Law for supporting our scholarship through summer grants and fall sabbaticals, and the Maryland Law School and the George Washington University Medical School for providing meeting facilities. A crucial session at the Maryland School of Law was supported by the Ward Kershaw Environmental Symposium Fund.
Professor Alyson Flournoy, a CPR board member and Director of the Environmental and Land Use Program at the University of Florida Levin College of Law, and Katherine Baer, a CPR senior policy analyst, provided invaluable insights and suggestions as peer reviewers of an early draft of xvii These are difficult times for science in the zone where it converges with public policy. Of course it should not be expected that peer-reviewed science, even carefully done, will be a commanding presence in policy discussions, even where scientific issues are prominent. Other matters, like the relationship between costs and benefits of a project or distributive justice implications, may be more decisive, for perfectly good reasons. But science has been playing a critically important role in several areas that have become important exercises of government responsibility, including, but not limited to, environmental quality regulations, litigation over damages associated with the external costs of private activity ("toxic torts"), and the legal responsibility of manufacturers for product harms. What has happened, in this more political contemporary environment, to science and the people who practice it? That is the subject of this book. In this prologue, I hope to provide a quick overview of some features of the new terrain. In later chapters, others will deliver a much closer and more scholarly look at them.
In the mid-1970s -a few years after the first volley of laws protecting environmental quality -there was little public skepticism about, and only limited political pressure against, the role of science in regulation under these statutes, or its influence in legal proceedings about product harms. When I became commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration early in 1977, the Medical Devices Amendments were only a year old, and we were just trying to figure out how to implement them. Our only model was the approval process for new drugs -a much older part of the law, and one about which there were chronic complaints from both left and right. Was it too fast, exposing Americans to unsuspected hazards, or too slow, robbing them of potentially useful therapies? That debate is alive and well and scheduled for a long run. After all, there is no normative standard by which we may judge whether the cost of foregone innovation is perfectly balanced against the cost of iatrogenic illness. Points of optimum social utility are notoriously hard to identify. But the science used by the agency, and the role of science in the other contexts I have mentioned, generally enjoyed respect in those years.
My impression is that things are quite different now, and the difficulties analyzed in the succeeding chapters afford a rich sketch of the current environment. I suggest that the change is the result of a major policy shift -one that began before the Bush Administration took office but was extended and made more forceful by policies advocated during both of the last two presidential election campaigns and made explicit by legislative and administrative actions since. The overarching theme has been that government is too large and complex and that the effect of its combination of size and regulatory mission unnecessarily disrupts the efficient operation of a market economy. President George W. Bush in his election campaigns repeatedly called attention to the size of the federal bureaucracy. He has not set specific goals for its reduction in force, and indeed has achieved none. But the call is still heard from more colorful Republican Party conservatives such as Grover Norquist, who says that he hopes for a government that he can "take into his bathroom and drown in the tub." Thus, to the extent that science still plays an important role in most regulatory decisions, its role has become more suspect by those who find regulations burdensome or of questionable legitimacy. The challenges to science do not all come from the right; members of consumer organizations and others have often charged science establishments with paying too little attention to legitimate representatives of the public -"stakeholders" in the current patois. But the strongest current challenge comes from a quite different quarter. It probably evolved from the Republican congressional sweep in 1994, when Representative Newt Gingrich and his newly elected allies promised a radical deconstruction of environmental regulation. They discovered that the American public actually liked the environmental rules, and that campaign largely failed. But it left behind a Republican majority and antiregulatory embers that could be fanned into flames by the interest of President Bush and his cabinet in redistributing power in the agencies and in the courts. A particular objective was the challenge to scientific findings as dispositive, or even influential, in determinations about regulation or product harm. One early theme fits under the heading of "tort reform." Administration spokespersons regularly point to the health care costs associated with medical malpractice litigation, taking advantage of public skepticism about lawyers. They have also emphasized the charge that plaintiffs' attorneys regularly introduce "junk science" in support of malpractice or product liability claims. Of course, there is some truth here: Some expert witnesses have offered questionable scientific conclusions in support of plaintiffs, and that has led to the series of three Supreme Court decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony in jury trials. The so-called "Daubert trilogy" (Daubert, Kumho Tire, and Joiner, all discussed in much greater detail in Chapters 1 and 6) has had a lingering effect on product liability litigation. In the view of most observers, the "Daubert criteria" for permitting expert testimony have made it more difficult for scientists to present evidence, adding up to some degree of bias in favor of defendants.
The Daubert principle, however, has invaded other provinces of the law only to a very limited extent. In criminal courts, it has almost never been applied to challenge the "expert" testimony of police or other government experts (medical examiners, fingerprint experts, and the like) despite a general sense among scientists that forensic data are very open to question. Nor have Daubert challenges been characteristic of administrative law procedures in the regulatory arena. But this is not a time for confidence that the latter, in particular, may be just over the horizon.
Developments in the legislative arena have also broadened the zone for attacks on science. In fulfilling its responsibility under the Clean Air Act to use scientific data in establishing National Ambient Air Quality Standards, the Environmental Protection Agency cited a study done by researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health on the effect of small (PM 2.5) particles in the air-sheds of several cities. It was cited in the proposed regulation, but a late-night Senate amendment opened the primary data in the study to examination by other interested parties. The "Shelby Amendment," more formally called the Data Access Act, made federally supported research project data eligible for public access through the Freedom of Information Act. In issuing governing regulations under the statute as required, the Office of Management and Budget limited the scope to scientific findings used in regulatory actions that had significant policy or economic impacts. But the amendment widened a zone that industry had already opened through discovery proceedings in litigation. For example, well before the Shelby Amendment, Professor Herbert Needleman's studies on the effect of lead toxicity on intellectual development in children had been made the subject of a lawsuit by the lead industry. In the course of discovery, "expert witnesses" for the industry had obtained Needleman's research records. They developed a basis for a charge of research misconduct, which went to the Office of Research Integrity at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the funder of Needleman's work. Needleman's campus at the time was the University of Pittsburgh, perhaps not an ideal venue for someone contesting with the heavy metals industry. When the university was asked to investigate, the process was prolonged until a faculty body arranged for a session in which Needleman and his attorneys were able to confront the claimants and cross-examine them. The charge was found baseless, but the matter died, leaving some damaged confidence behind it.
That incident and others have made many scientists worry that more recent actions will open their work to reinterpretation and to whatever revision critics want to make in the findings. The worry has been exacerbated by recent regulatory developments, as well as by new events in an area where the science has become especially political. The Shelby Amendment was followed by another statutory initiative, the Data Quality Act -sometimes referred to as "son of Shelby." Regulations under this statute permit petitioners to challenge the quality of science proffered by the government to educate consumers or to support other actions. This new zone of challenge has produced challenges to agencies and to the science on which they have based advice to the public -for example, on salt consumption. But there have also been challenges to the scientists themselves, including demands for underlying data.
Perhaps the most recent and most alarming development has come from congressional friends of those with particular economic and political interests. A well-organized opposition to the scientific consensus on global climate change has produced little original science of its own, but it has campaigned successfully to obtain primary data from scientists whose findings have supported global warming. As a journal editor, I sometimes get reasonable requests from a scientist-reader for reagents, materials, or data
